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ABSTRACT. Agencies in the executive branch are better situated than other political
institutions to take advantage of opportunities to expand their power base by responding quickly
and decisively to real or imagined crises. The executive has structural advantages over the other
branches because it can respond faster to perceived emergencies. Congress is hampered more
than the executive by gridlock caused by special-interest group pressures when it tries to act
quicdy. The legislative process is also inherently slower than the executive process because the
executive can launch into unilateral action, as by filing a lawsuit. The executive's structural
advantage over the judiciary is even more complete than its advantage over Congress because the
judiciary has no power to initiate action. Executive action, particularly that of agencies,
determines the course of law. This Essay argues that the ascendancy of the executive branch in
policymaking is an unintended consequence of the modern administrative state. The emergence
of the executive as the fulcrum of power within the administrative state upsets the traditional
balance of powers among the three branches of government. This imbalance can be counteracted
only by a concerted effort by the federal judiciary to rein in executive power that improperly
usurps Congress's authority to make law.
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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium announces that the executive branch is "the most
accessible, politically accountable force in government at the local, state, and
national levels"-and that statement is accurate, at least insofar as
accountability is measured by the force of the response, rather than the long-
term desirability of that response. Due to certain structural advantages,
executive branch agencies are better situated to respond quickly and decisively
to emergencies. As a result, they can expand their power base more readily than
the other branches of government.
Basic political science shows us why this is so. Gridlock- caused by special-
interest group pressures and the delays of bicameral decision-making-
hampers Congress. The judiciary is no better off in terms of policymaking.
Judges must wait until a plaintiff musters the initiative to file a lawsuit, and
then they must further wait through the tedious processes of evidence-
gathering, motions practice, and trial before they can formulate new policy (or
confirm old policy).
Unlike the judiciary, executive branch agencies can take unilateral action by
filing lawsuits, and unlike Congress, they can act quickly because of
streamlined decision-making processes. In the realm of corporate law, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)-the focus of this Essay-can
institute civil litigation in the form of enforcement actions, while the Justice
Department and state attorneys general can institute criminal litigation.
Thanks to these structural advantages, executive action, particularly agency
action, determines the course of law. Indeed, even when Congress acts by
passing massive reform legislation, as it did in 2002 with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the ultimate result is an increase in the power of the executive to create
policy, not a reallocation of power to the legislative or judicial branches.
The ascendancy of the executive branch in policymaking is an unintended
consequence of the modern administrative state. The emergence of the
executive branch as the fulcrum of power within the administrative state
represents a deviation from the traditional balance of powers among the three
branches of government. Only a concerted effort by the federal judiciary can
rein in agencies that improperly usurp the authority of the legislative branch
through the enforcement process.
Using the SEC as an example, Part I demonstrates how the flexibility and
forcefulness of agency action has altered the traditional balance of power
among the branches. Rather than sharing power, the SEC has become the
1. Judy Coleman, Introduction to Symposium, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors,
Presidents, and the Rule of Law, 115 YALE L.J. 2215, 2216 (2006).
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locus of power in corporate law enforcement. The legislative and judicial
branches, ostensibly charged with making law and interpreting the law, have
taken on merely supporting roles. The result has been that the agency most
willing to exercise power immediately appropriates lawmaking authority.
Part II illustrates the theory developed in Part I with three recent
interactions between the executive and its rival branches. In addition to
showing how the executive has seized power horizontally from the other
branches, each example illustrates how the federal executive acts in a
policymaking role parallel to that traditionally held by the states.
Part III analyzes the various mechanisms used by the branches to
implement policy, with particular emphasis on relative efficiency, ability to
control an agenda, and susceptibility to political influence.
The implication of this analysis is rather radical: It suggests a new
justification for more activist judicial intervention to dampen the power of the
executive. If the executive branch is more powerful than the Framers intended,
then something should be done to redress this constitutional disequilibrium
and reduce the probability that such concentrated power will be abused. A
logical possibility would be for the judiciary to develop legal doctrines that are
less deferential to the executive. Yet recent jurisprudential trends, which give
ever-increasing deference to the facts as found and the law as interpreted by
executive agencies, indicate that there is a vast distance between the judicial
approach that is desired and the reality that is observed.
I. SHARED POWER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE EXECUTIVE
AND SUPERIOR RESPONSE TIME
Traditional theory posits that the U.S. constitutional system is most
accurately described as a power-sharing arrangement among the various
branches of government 2 Because the executive branch has a different agenda
and different interests and powers from the judges and legislators who
populate the other branches, this power-sharing is not always harmonious.
3
These structural differences inevitably lead the executive into conflict with the
other branches. 4 Such conflict is healthy. It mitigates the onslaught of special-
2. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 7-9 (199o); MARK A. PETERSON,
LEGISLATING TOGETHER: THE WHITE HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL FROM EISENHOWER TO
REAGAN 76-99 (1990).
3. See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 3 (making this point in the context of the President and
Congress).
4. Id.
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interest group pressure for legislation during times of ordinary politics.' In
addition, conflict is an integral aspect of the separation of powers, designed to
protect limited government.
This point has been powerfully made by Professors Terry Moe and Scott
Wilson:
There is nothing that Congress can do to eliminate the president's
executive power. He is not Congress's agent. He has his own
constitutional role to play and his own constitutional powers to
exercise, powers that are not delegated to him by Congress and cannot
be taken away. Any notion that Congress makes the laws and that the
president's job is simply to execute them -to follow orders, in effect -
overlooks the essence of separation of powers. The president is an
authority in his own right, coequal to Congress and not subordinate to
it.
6
It is probably true that the executive branch started out as (at most)
coequal to Congress. z However, due to a variety of structural factors that
probably were not anticipated by the Framers, the relationship between the
executive and the other branches has evolved over time.
This Part will consider four primary factors driving that shift: (i) the
President's unique power to act unilaterally to implement policy; (2) the
increased salience and brevity of policy windows (those periods of time in
which it is possible to make new policy); (3) the rise of participatory
democracy (in which it is considered legitimate for the groups most affected by
new policy to influence its formation); and (4) the substitution of procedural
rights for substantive rights.
A. The Executive's Power To Act Unilaterally
The executive possesses considerable power to affect policy unilaterally
both in the implementation of laws and in the preemption of legislative activity
through the use of executive orders, proclamations, and memoranda. One of
the odd consequences of our lawmaking process is that it is virtually impossible
for Congress to act without increasing the power of the executive branch,
s. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225-27 (1986).
6. Moe & Wilson, supra note 3, at 21.
7. See Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch
in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 47 (1998) (describing the perception among
members of the Constitutional Convention that the three branches of government were
coequal).
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which must implement new statutes that the legislature produces. 8 The
resources and discretion that accompany that task inevitably lead to an increase
in the executive branch's power.
Once a statute is in place, the executive has enormous discretion to decide
how and when-or whether-to implement it. For example, the President can
undermine the statute creating the Federal Emergency Management Agency
simply by staffing the agency with political cronies, unless and until an
outraged public demands that the situation be corrected. The SEC can take a
hands-off regulatory approach with respect to corporate governance issues
until it becomes politically expedient for the agency to inject itself into this
arena. The Department of Education can take the view that education policy is
best left to the states until it perceives that aggressively asserting its own
policies is in its best political or institutional self-interest.
With such wide-ranging control, as well as a streamlined system for
choosing who wields that control, the executive has the power to act
unilaterally when it implements laws. This power to take unilateral action can
be seen as part of a "residuum of unenumerated power" contained in Article II
of the Constitution,' which otherwise bestows on the President "the executive
Power" and the authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." °
Moreover, this power is streamlined within the executive branch. As Professors
Moe and Wilson observe, whenever the President feels so inclined, he can
"review or reverse agency decisions, coordinate agency actions, make changes
in agency leadership, or otherwise impose his views on government .... "" The
other branches, by contrast, are characterized by process, disagreement, and
deliberation.
Checks provided by the other branches have turned out to be weak in the
face of the modern administrative state. While at first blush it might appear
that Congress's so-called "power of the purse" is a significant check on the
8. Moe & Wilson, supra note 3, at 23 ("[A]Ithough Congress can try to limit presidential
prerogatives through statute, the president is greatly empowered through statutory law
whether Congress intends it or not.").
9. RICHARD M. PIous, THE AMERicAN PRESIDENCY 38 (1979).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, Cl. 1; id. § 3; see also Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The
President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006) (arguing that the Take Care Clause is
a positive grant of power to the executive).
ii. Moe & Wilson, supra note 3, at 20. For discussions of the theory of the unitary executive, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997); and Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S.
Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667
(2003).
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executive's power,' 2 in reality it is politically costly for Congress to withhold
funding from administrative agencies. Such political costs take the form of loss
of support from interest groups, bad publicity, and loss of cooperation from
agencies. Congress is also inherently constrained in its ability to take the
initiative in making policy because the laws enacted by a legislature are not
self-enforcing: They must be executed by the executive and the bureaucracy
under its supervision. Courts clearly cannot take the initiative in making new
policy. They must wait for cases to come to them, and even then their sphere of
action is highly constrained by procedural rules and tradition and by the
requirement that their decisions be justified by written opinions, all of which
combine to limit judges' flexibility.
Moreover, political scientists have noted that Presidents regularly effect
policy change outside of any "bargaining framework" with Congress via
national security directives, executive orders, proclamations, executive
agreements, and memoranda to agency heads.' 3 The increase in the number of
presidential memoranda and executive orders in recent years supports the
conventional wisdom that the ability to act unilaterally is a vitally important
attribute of the modern presidency.' 4
To this well-developed literature, I add the insight that Presidents act
entrepreneurially as well as unilaterally. Presidents can preempt legislative
action by acting first. Recent Presidents have acted entrepreneurially to affect
the law in a range of policy areas. President Clinton issued executive orders to
bar federal contracts with companies that permanently replace striking workers
and to prohibit the federal government from discriminating against workers on
the basis of sexual orientation. President George W. Bush used an executive
order to launch his Faith-Based Initiative, which encourages religious
organizations to seek federal funds to treat social problems.' 6 Thus, Presidents
can not only act without Congress, but can also deprive Congress of the
initiative to act. As elaborated in the following Section, the power to act quickly
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting the withdrawal of money from the Treasury without
prior congressional appropriation).
13. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 5-24 (2003).
14. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTWVE
DIRECT ACTION 68-70 (2002); Phillip J. Cooper, Power Tools for an Effective and Responsible
Presidency, 29 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 529, 532-33 (1997); Phillip J. Cooper, Presidential Memoranda
and Executive Orders: Of Patchwork Quilts, Trump Cards, and Shell Games, 31 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 126, 136-39 (2001); William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417, 421 (2005).
is. Exec. Order No. 13,o87, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998) (prohibiting discrimination);
Exec. Order No. 12,954, 6o Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 8, 1995) (barring contracts).
i6. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2422
115:2416 20o6
HeinOnline -- 115 Yale L.J.  2422 2005-2006
EXECUTIVE BRANCH USURPATION OF POWER
in the information age translates into the power to command vital interest
group support.
B. The Disappearing Policy Window
When the Framers designed the basic constitutional scheme in place today,
they were constructing an institutional framework on a legal landscape wholly
devoid of both administrative agencies and federal statutes. The primary
source of law was common law. In the Framers' world, judges had significant
power. Legislatures had the potential to affect policy outcomes by passing
statutes that encroached on the existing common-law rules. Executives had no
administrative agencies to command and fewer laws to execute. The presidency
was, of course, a considerable position, but in that era a President's power lay
more in his ability to persuade than in his power to command. The Framers
designed a constitutional system founded on the principle of separation of
powers. The executive was not empowered to create laws or adjudicate
disputes. Instead, searching review of executive and legislative action by an
independent judiciary was deemed essential "to provide a check against self-
judging by the political branches."' 7
Over the course of the twentieth century, the power of the judiciary has
decreased in relation to that of the executive and legislative branches. We
currently live in what Judge Guido Calabresi has accurately described as the
"age of statutes. '', 8 Written laws have replaced common-law rules as the
primary source of public and private ordering. In his important and influential
book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Judge Calabresi argues that the
massive outpouring of statutes in the post-New Deal era has upset the
traditional balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary.' 9 He
contends that courts should restore the traditional balance between the
judiciary and the legislature by applying common-law techniques of judging to
update both common-law and statutory rules.2°
Though I agree with Judge Calabresi's prescription for the expansion of
judicial power, I would argue that the constitutional disequilibrium is largely
due to an expansion in the executive's power within the constitutional scheme,
rather than to an expansion in the legislature's power. Doctrines of judicial
deference toward administrative agencies have eroded the separation of powers
17. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123, 132 (1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
18. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 82, 101-09.
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as originally conceived by the Framers and have enabled executive agencies to
exercise legislative and judicial powers-to self-judge.21  The executive
increasingly generates the policies that shape our everyday world, and the
judiciary has not shown much interest in checking the executive's actions,
despite encouragement from Congress to do so.'
The modern presidency has expanded its power relative to the other
branches of government in part because of the increasingly streamlined nature
of preference formation within the executive branch itself. Unlike Congress
and the courts, the executive branch has its own well-defined, highly
entrenched set of bureaucratic preferences. The administration, including its
agencies, knows where it stands on virtually every issue-unlike a Congress
divided starkly by party lines and even within parties. The executive is an
institution with a powerful hierarchical structure that promotes efficiency
relative to the far more diffusely organized Congress. Because Congress cannot
act without first achieving internal consensus, the executive's structure allows
it to act much more quickly and effectively.
The window for making policy, in the age of the Internet, has become
shorter and more salient when an important issue arises. The increase in the
speed of communications has translated directly into a reduction in the time
given to politicians to respond effectively to new information and events. This
trend tends to allocate power to the branch with the fewest constraints on its
ability to enact policy.23 Because the executive branch is characterized by
streamlined policy preferences, it can take advantage of policy windows
without having to mediate among members with competing preferences.
While Congress has difficulty coordinating its response to rapidly changing
events, the executive branch can capitalize on its ability to act quickly and
unilaterally to structure agendas and create new policies before the other
branches can organize a response. 4
21. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
22. See discussion infra Part III about Congress's interesting exhortation of judges to take an
activist role in constitutional interpretation. These exhortations are observed most notably
during confirmation hearings.
23. For excellent descriptions of the way that public-policy entrepreneurs can use policy
windows to pursue long-sought objectives, see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES
AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165-94 (2d ed. 1995); and MARGARET LEvI, OF RULE AND REvENUE 21
(1988).
24. See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 13, at 6-23 (describing the ability of Presidents to effect policy
change outside a bargaining framework); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN:
ExECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 4-6 (2001) (describing how Presidents can
use executive orders to make important policy choices); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H.
BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND MATERIALS 88 (1988) ("Presidents use
executive orders to implement many of their most important initiatives.").
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C. Participatory Democracy
The speed of executive response time makes the executive appear to be the
most efficient branch of government. The executive's responsiveness puts it in
a better position, vis-4-vis the other branches, in the political context of a
participatory democracy. The rise of participatory democracy, which has been
facilitated by technological changes that have reduced the costs of
communicating with politicians, has put increased demands on elected officials
to respond quickly to pressure from a highly engaged public.2" The electorate
tends to evaluate elected officials' effectiveness based on the timeliness of their
responses, and developments in technology and the media have increased the
public's expectations. 6 The executive branch clearly has advantages in this
arena over the legislature and the judiciary.
It was not always this way. The Framers' conception of human nature was
highly realistic. 7 They envisioned a polity composed of citizens who might
engage in occasional episodes of civic engagement but during ordinary times
would be far less concerned with politics and public values than with
commercial issues and their private lives and personal interests2 8 In such a
polity, people are poorly informed, and, to the extent that they inject
themselves into the political sphere at all, such incursions are more in the
nature of a hobby than anything else.29 Politicians are merely agents, operating
at a vast distance from their principals -geographically as well as
25. See BRAD FITCH & KATHY GOLDSCHMIDT, COMMUNICATING WITH CONGRESS: How CAPITOL
HILL Is COPING WITH THE SURGE IN CITIZEN ADVOCACY 15 (2005),
http ://www.cmfweb.org/SupportingFiles/documents/Communicating-with-Congress--
Report-l.pdf (discussing the rise of participatory democracy as measured by citizen
communications with elected officials via e-mail as well as faxes, telegrams, and postcards
generated online).
26. Id. at 41 ("Constituents now expect on-demand access to information, services available 24-
7, and rapid responses to communications .... ).
27. See Roger Scruton, Limits to Democracy, NEW CRITERION, Jan. 2006, at 20, 20 (noting that
the American Constitution was "designed both to permit democratic government and to
restrain it in the interests of freedom" and was "based on a realistic view of human nature").
28. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 230-43 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 6 (1998).
29. Thus, the Framers' view closely tracks that of Joseph Schumpeter, see JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 261-63 (Harper Colophon 1975)
(1942) (arguing that citizens in democracies are ignorant of the information required to
make policy judgments and generally have a "reduced sense of responsibility"), and of Jean
Jacques Rousseau, see JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 94 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762) ("The people of England regards itself as free: but it
is grossly mistaken: it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as
they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and [the freedom expressed by voting] is nothing.").
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psychologically. The Constitution, according to this paradigm, organizes the
decision-making processes of government to compensate for agency costs
between citizens and their representatives. It increases the transaction costs of
lawmaking to make it easy to monitor and thwart governmental actors.
Among the Framers, the Federalists, and Madison in particular, worried
about the influence of factions and sought to design a constitutional structure
that would encourage representatives to act for the common good.30 The
Federalists understood that the ordinary politics that follows in the wake of
constitutional lawmaking is narrow, oriented toward special-interest groups,
partisan, and not widely participatory.31 Madison's solution was to abandon
"the classical republican understanding that citizens generally should
participate directly in the processes of government," and instead to use
representation to guard against "interest-group struggle," trusting that the
separation of powers among three branches would provide meaningful checks
in the event that one branch became dominated by a particular interest group.32
Participatory democracy competes with the agency-cost theory of
democratic lawmaking and threatens the kind of "interest-group struggle" that
Madison and his fellow Federalists feared. 33 Political scientists associate the
increase in participatory democracy with the protest movements of the 196os.34
The idea of participatory democracy has become increasingly trendy, with the
Internet viewed as the means by which broad participation in political
decision-making can be effectuated. 35
30. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39-42
(1985).
31. See ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 5-12 (1981);
Macey, supra note 5, at 229-30. For an excellent account of public choice theory in action, see
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF
(1935).
32. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 42-44.
33. Cf Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in Civic ENGAGEMENT
IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395, 405-13 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999)
(describing the ways in which officeholders have become more exposed to direct public
pressure, especially to interest-group pressure, in the second half of the twentieth century).
34. See, e.g., TOM HAYDEN ET AL., THE PORT HURON STATEMENT OF THE STUDENTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1962), available at http://www.studentsforademocraticsociety
.org/documents/port huron.html ("As a social system we seek the establishment of a
democracy of individual participation....").
35. See Michael Hauben, Participatory Democracy from the 196os and SDS into the Future On-
line, http://www.columbia.edu/-hauben/CS/netdemocracy-6os.txt (last visited Aug. 6,
2006).
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Participatory democracy poses a threat to representative democracy because
it replaces the decision-making authority of elected officials and other
designated government officials with decision-making by citizens acting
through various instrumentalities of direct, "real time" participation. The re-
invigorated radical group Students for a Democratic Society is one example of
an organization that has recognized the potential for creating "a community of
active citizens [who] discuss and debate the issues affecting their lives" and
thereby "bring about a more democratic society" via the Internet.3
6
For the executive branch, however, participatory democracy poses more of
an opportunity than a threat. Even those who advocate participatory
democracy recognize that actual implementation of policies still requires the
intervention of the executive. Presidents can justify taking the sorts of
unilateral actions described in Section L.A on the ground that such actions are
legitimated by the public's direct demands, rather than by expressions of
popular will that have been mediated through democratic institutions like the
legislature.
The President's unilateral and preemptive response to the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States provides a useful illustration of the way in
which the executive can take advantage of popular outcry to expand his own
power, as well as the power of the institution. In the wake of the attacks, the
public demanded government action to protect the country from future acts of
terrorism.37 National security crises of this magnitude open gaping policy
windows of the kind discussed in the previous Section. These events expand
the power of the executive. And once the executive exercises powers for the first
time, it is unlikely to relinquish them readily.
Following the terrorist strikes, President Bush issued an executive order
creating a new cabinet position, the Secretary of Homeland Security, who was
given the power to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies
and private entities to fight terrorism. 8 Then, in early October, when a bill to
federalize airport security was languishing in Congress, President Bush broke
the impasse by promising to issue an executive order to accomplish the same
result.39 In addition to these preemptive executive acts, President Bush ordered
an ultimately successful military invasion of Afghanistan, which accomplished
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, A Town Hall on Terror: Residents Push Members of Congress for
Security, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at Ci. Families of September ii, Inc. was formed in
October 2001 to lobby for policies that reduce the threat of terrorism. See Families of
September ii, http://www.familiesofseptemberil.org (last visited Aug. 6, 2oo6).
38. Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
39. See Lizette Alvarez, A Nation Challenged: Airport Security; White House Battles Plan on
Airports, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 13, 2001, at Bi.
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its goal of toppling the Taliban regime without a formal declaration of war by
Congress.40
The most impressive display of presidential power after September 11 was
President Bush's creation of "an entirely new court system to mete out justice
in [the administration's] efforts to hunt down and punish suspected
terrorists."41 On November 13, 2001, the President signed an executive order
allowing special military tribunals to try any non-citizen suspected of plotting
or committing terrorist acts or harboring known terrorists.42 The order gave
these tribunals the power to conduct closed trials anywhere inside the United
States or abroad and to impose the death penalty.4
The executive had no need for congressional assistance. The President's
decision not to consult with Congress was not due to reluctance or
ineffectiveness on the legislature's part. As Professors Neal Katyal and
Laurence Tribe observe in their criticism of this display of presidential power,
"[flor the President to proceed on his own to alter the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, redesigning the very architecture of justice, without any
colorable claim that time is too short for Congress to act, is to succumb to an
executive unilateralism all too familiar in recent days."" This was a clear
example of the use of presidential authority in a context in which it was highly
4o. Exec. Order No. 13,239, 66 Fed. Reg. 64,907 (Dec. 12, 2001). While it did not pass a formal
declaration of war, Congress did pass the Authorization for Use of Military Force one week
after September 11, authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force"
against any country or person involved in planning the attacks. Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(Supp. 1II 2003)).
41. HOWELL, supra note 13, at 2. President Bush's creation of a separate court system for non-
citizens suspected of being terrorists was not entirely unprecedented. See Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942). However, the indefinite duration of the war on terror means that
individuals may be denied access to civilian courts for many years to come; thus, the scope
of President Bush's action far exceeds that of any prior use of military tribunals.
42. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
43. Originally, the Executive Order required the vote of two-thirds of the judges on a panel to
impose any sentence, including the death penalty. Id. at 57,835. However, in response to
heavy criticism, the Defense Department began amending the regulations governing
military tribunals in March 2002. See Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 1962, 1971-73 (2005) (explaining the criticism and amendments). One amendment
requires a unanimous vote for a sentence of death. Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32
C.F.R. § 9.6(f) (2005); see also HOWELL, supra note 13, at 2.
44. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, iii YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2428
115:2416 20o6
HeinOnline -- 115 Yale L.J.  2428 2005-2006
EXECUTIVE BRANCH USURPATION OF POWER
unlikely that the executive would have been able to obtain the congressional
consent envisioned by the Constitution. 41
President Clinton also used power this way,46 though President Bush's
actions may have since overshadowed any executive branch overreaching
during the Clinton years. As Professor Howell remarks, "[r] ather than wait on
Congress, Clinton simply acted, daring his Republican opponents and the
courts to try to overturn him. With a few notable exceptions, neither did. '47
Among the more notorious of President Clinton's uses of executive power was
his invocation of his powers under the Antiquities Act of 1906 to designate
millions of acres of federal land as protected national monuments. 48 President
Clinton also issued Executive Order No. 12,866, which diluted the cost-benefit
analysis that agencies are required to prepare for review by the Office of
Management and Budget.49
The rise of participatory democracy has enhanced the ability and the power
of Presidents to act quickly in response to public pressure without timely
checks by Congress or the judiciary. This destabilizes the constitutional
equilibrium that the Federalists hoped would result from the separation of
powers.5 0
To this point, the focus has been on the interplay between the executive
and the other branches at the federal level, but it should be noted that the
dynamic discussed here also applies to state government. In 2004, the
Governors of Washington, Oregon, and California issued a series of
recommendations aimed at reducing emissions that contribute to global
45. Not surprisingly, it appears that presidential authority is often analyzed in a partisan
manner. See, e.g., TODD F. GAZIANO, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND OTHER PRESIDENTIAL DIREcTrvEs (2001),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/LM2.cfm (arguing that President Clinton
abused his constitutional authority by his use of executive power, but making only sparing
mention of similar uses of such authority by Republican Presidents).
46. In fact, it was President Clinton who was said to have "perfected the art of go-alone
governing." HOwELL, supra note 13, at 5 (internal citation omitted). President Clinton
"issued a blizzard of executive orders, regulations, proclamations and other decrees to
achieve his goals, with or without the blessing of Congress." Id. (internal citation omitted).
Indeed, even in the waning days of his presidency, executive orders "fl[ew] off Clinton's
desk, mandating government action on issues from mental health to food safety." Id.
(internal citation omitted); see also id. at S-6 (providing additional examples of Clinton's
displays of unilateral, preemptive power in the healthcare and gun control policy arenas).
47. Id. at 5.
48. See GAZLANO, supra note 45 (criticizing Clinton's use of his Antiquities Act powers).
49. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
5o. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 43-44 (explicating James Madison's views on the separation
of powers).
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warming as part of the West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative."1
The Governors also pledged to explore the adoption of standards that would
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from vehicles and to establish
regional goals for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 2 In 2005, New
York Governor George Pataki announced an initiative to reduce homelessness
in New York City by building additional housing units for those living on the
streets or in emergency shelters. s3 Thus, like Presidents, governors enjoy the
ability to act preemptively and entrepreneurially.
D. Procedure Versus Substance
The erosion of the separation of powers has been described as "the
crowning jewel of the modern administrative revolution."54 Executive agencies
routinely issue rules and regulations -essentially lawmaking activities-and
adjudicate enforcement actions. As administrative agencies have taken on more
legislative and judicial functions, the judiciary's abdication of searching,
independent review of agency lawmaking has further increased the power of
the executive. Process-oriented decision-making in the judiciary only
exacerbates the executive branch's ability to overstep and take up policymaking
space belonging to the other branches. The Chevron doctrine has diminished
the judiciary's role as a source of substantive review of agency action. 5 In fact,
Chevron and a subsequent case, United States v. Mead,56 contribute to a doctrine
that enables the executive to neutralize the judiciary's capacity to influence its
decisions by completing certain procedural formalities prior to acting. The
judiciary's role has also been restricted by the Seminole Rock principle,
according to which judges are to defer to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation. 7  As long as the process required under the
Administrative Procedure Act is followed, an agency can promulgate
51. West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative, http://www.ef.org/westcoastclimate
(last visited Aug. 6, 2oo6).
52. Id.
53. See Press Release, Governor George E. Pataki, Governor Pataki, Mayor Bloomberg
Announce Unprecedented Partnership To Reduce Homelessness in New York City (Nov. 7,
2005), http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/os/11o7o51.htm.
54. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231, 1248
(1994).
ss. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But see Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J.
2580 (2006) (pointing out that certain Justices continue to overturn agency action at rates
similar to those present before Chevron).
56. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
57. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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ambiguous rules and later declare their meanings when it implements the rules
through adjudication. 8 In effect, an agency has the power to displace judicial
judgment on the meaning of the laws that it writes.59
While the necessity of complying with procedural formalities may limit
executive action in some modest ways, these procedural requirements do not
significantly impede the executive's ability to shape the law's practical effects
through enforcement and regulation. Even with respect to procedural
requirements, the Supreme Court has upheld informal rulemaking and has
deferred to agency choices of rules of procedure, an approach that further
limits judicial checks on agency power.6 ° Deference to agency interpretations of
statutes and regulations reduces the ability of the judiciary to serve as a
meaningful check on executive action.
II. CASE STUDIES IN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
In no realm of politics are the interactions among the various branches and
levels of government as interesting and as complicated as in the field of
business organizations and corporate law. The federal government makes
frequent and important incursions into this regulatory space. At the same time,
however, there is an ongoing, vigorous competition for corporate charters
among the states. Moreover, all three branches of government-at both the
state and the federal level -have, at various times, staked out important policy
positions in this area.
The following Sections present case studies that illustrate the interplay
between the executive branch and the other branches at both the federal and
the state level in the field of corporate law and finance.
A. The Delaware Courts Versus the SEC on Shareholder Voting
The most important vote-buying case in the past decade is Hewlett v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., which arose out of Hewlett-Packard's proposed merger
with Compaq. 61 At the time, Hewlett-Packard and Compaq were, respectively,
the second- and third-largest computer companies in the United States. The
basis for the plaintiffs' vote-buying claim involved a telephone conversation
58. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 662 (1996).
sg. Id. at 682.
6o. See E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 MAPQ. L.
REV. 797, 815-16 (1992).
61. No. CIV.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 549137 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2002).
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that Carly Fiorina, Hewlett-Packard's CEO, had with officials of Deutsche
Asset Management (DeAM), which owned seventeen million shares of the
company and had voted against the merger. 62 During the conversation, Fiorina
told the DeAM managers that a vote for the merger was "of great importance
to our ongoing relationship.
6
,
On March 19, 2002, following the personal appeal by Fiorina, the DeAM
fund manager switched its vote in favor of the merger. The vote switch
occurred shortly after Deutsche Bank signed a $4 billion revolving credit
facility with Hewlett-Packard to provide Hewlett-Packard with the financing
necessary to pay for the merger. The transaction was attacked both by
aggrieved shareholders in the Delaware state courts and by a federal
administrative agency, the SEC.
This case illustrates the extent to which statutes have vested broad power in
federal administrative agencies to cross into what were once state-regulated
arenas. In particular, there traditionally has been a strong line of demarcation
between the jurisdiction of the states, which regulated corporate governance
and the internal affairs of domestically chartered companies, and the
jurisdiction of the SEC, whose purview was the regulation of matters related to
corporate disclosure and securities trading.64 The SEC's regulatory efforts in
the Hewlett-Packard vote-buying case indicate that this traditional boundary is
no longer policed by the courts as it once was.
Though the SEC is an independent agency,6 s the President still wields
substantial influence over its actions. For example, the President has unfettered
power to remove the chairs of administrative agencies such as the SEC from
their positions and broad power to dismiss other commissioners as well, at
least "for cause," a term that is broadly defined.66 Professors Lawrence Lessig
and Cass Sunstein even argue that the President has the authority to fire
commissioners of independent agencies who have acted in ways that are
inconsistent with the President's views of sound public policy. 67 The
62. Voting in corporate law is not anonymous, and shareholders may cancel previous proxies
simply by executing subsequent proxies.
63. Steve Lohr, Hewlett's Chief Back in Court, Scoffs at Accusation of Coercion, N.Y. TiMES, Apr.
26, 2002, at C1.
64. The classic case describing the distribution of authority between the SEC and the states and
defending the states' authority against attempted encroachment by the SEC is Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,416-17 (D.C. Cir. 199o).
65. For example, SEC commissioners serve five-year terms, which means that their terms
exceed the four-year term of the President.
66. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 110-11 (1994).
67. Id. at iii.
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President's power to appoint agency officials, both in executive agencies and in
independent agencies, permits him to control agency policy and performance.68
Thus, the SEC's intrusion into the states' traditional regulation of corporate
fiduciary duties is yet another example of the expanded power and reach of the
President.
Before the SEC's involvement in the Hewlett-Packard case, the Delaware
Court of Chancery had already ruled on the issues. The court rather stunningly
had accepted Hewlett-Packard's argument that Fiorina was not trying to
influence DeAM's vote on the merger in her call to DeAM.69 The court held
that the plaintiff shareholders failed to meet their "significant burden" of
showing that DeAM's decision to switch its vote had not been for independent
business reasons.7" Instead of focusing on DeAM's motives, the court's critical
inquiry concerned Hewlett-Packard's motivations, and the court found the
evidence insufficient to find fault with the private dealings between Hewlett-
Packard and the bank.7
The Delaware court's hands-off approach starkly contrasts with the SEC's
approach, which was to sue DeAM for breaching its fiduciary duties as an
investment manager to its clients.72 The SEC argued that by failing to inform
its advisory clients of the existence of its material conflict of interest, DeAM
willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. 73 The SEC took the
position that investment advisers with material conflicts of interest must tell
their clients about those conflicts before voting on the basis of shares held for
the clients.74 This would empower clients "to decide-with their eyes wide
open-whether they want to vote the proxies themselves, allow the adviser to
vote them, or make some other arrangement. '75 In settlement of the matter,
68. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 49-59 (1997).
69. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C1V.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WE. 818091, at *13-*15 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 30, 2002).
70. Id. at *12, *15-*16.
i. Id. at *12.
7z. See Deutsche Asset Management, Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-8268, 8o SEC
Docket 2584 (Aug. 19, 2003).
73. Id.
74. Deutsche Asset Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 194o Release No. IA-216o, 8o
SEC Docket 2714 (Aug. 19, 2003).
75. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the National
Regulatory Services Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Compliance/Risk Management
Conference (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spcho9o9o3smc.htm.
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DeAM agreed to be censured, to cease and desist from further violations, and
to pay a civil penalty of $750,000. 76
The SEC litigation against DeAM and the litigation in Delaware against
Hewlett-Packard concerned the same central issue-fiduciary duties in the
context of conflicts of interest. Deutsche Bank was conflicted because the firm's
fiduciary duties to its asset management clients conflicted with its corporate
self-interest in pursuing Hewlett-Packard's lucrative investment banking
business. Hewlett-Packard was conflicted because, like many bidders, its
management team's personal interest in accomplishing the merger conflicted
with its obligation to enhance shareholder welfare. Moreover, consistent with
the Hubris Hypothesis of corporate takeovers, 77 Hewlett-Packard may have
been convinced that its valuation was correct, despite the contrary views of
Hewlett-Packard shareholders and the capital markets. The fact that the
Delaware courts and the SEC both sought to resolve the same aspect of the
Hewlett-Packard transaction shows how seamlessly the SEC, a federal
administrative agency, insinuated itself into a policy space traditionally
reserved to the states.
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, "[c]orporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern
the internal affairs of the corporation. ''7s In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the
D.C. Circuit recognized corporate governance to be an area of "firmly
established" state jurisdiction and noted that Congress did not contemplate
that the securities laws would permit the SEC to expand its jurisdiction into
this area. 79 Indeed, to do so "would circumvent the legislative process that is
virtually the sole protection for state interests. '' 8' Thus, although it may be the
case, as the court observed in Business Roundtable, that the legislative process
provides the principal protection for state interests, it is clear that the courts are
required to protect the legislative process from intrusion by agency officials or
other policymakers.
76. Deutsche Asset Management, 8o SEC Docket 2714.
7. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J.
Bus. 197, 197-216 (1986) (asserting that the phenomenon of corporate takeovers depends on
the bidder's presumption that its valuation is correct).
78. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
7g. 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69, 89 (1987)).
so. Id.
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B. Stock Exchange Governance and State Corporate Law Rules
In a more subtle way, the SEC has leveraged its authority over the self-
regulatory organizations that govern the stock exchanges. In effect, it has
bestowed upon itself virtually plenary regulatory authority over corporate
governance. 8' The SEC has commandeered the responsibility for formulating
the rules of internal governance of U.S. corporations, traditionally the province
of state legislatures and state courts.
Directors and officers of stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), are like the members of any other corporate board, and
regulation of corporate boards has traditionally been the province of state law.
Furthermore, the stock exchanges, for the most part, traditionally have
regulated themselves: Each exchange sets its own standards for companies and
traders. However, the SEC's assertion of power has changed that structure of
regulation. While the SEC has long regulated the actual exchange of stock to
ensure its compliance with federal securities law, the SEC has now made
inroads into regulating the governance of stock exchanges.
This usurpation of traditional state power has occurred gradually. The SEC
began by encouraging the exchanges to adopt corporate governance listing
standards "voluntarily.'' 82 The stock exchanges were to reach their own
consensus on what rules should govern. During the 1970s, the SEC urged the
exchanges to adopt rules that required corporate audit committees to be
composed of independent directors.83 The rules began changing with the
approval in March 1977 of a new NYSE rule requiring all listed domestic
companies to establish and maintain audit committees independent of
management and free from any relationship that might prevent the audit
committee member from exercising his or her independent judgment.8 4
In 1998, with the support and encouragement of the SEC, the NYSE and
the NASDAQ agreed to "sponsor a 'blue ribbon panel' . . . to make
recommendations on strengthening the role of audit committees in overseeing
81. See generally Order Approving NYSE and NASD Rulemaking Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (approving changes to listing standards
that would ensure the independence of directors and strengthen the corporate governance
practices of listed companies).
82. SPECIAL STUDY GROUP OF THE COMM. ON FED. REG. OF SEC., AM. BAR ASS'N, SPECIAL STUDY
ON MARKET STRUCTURE, LISTING STANDARDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (2002),
reprinted in 57 Bus. LAw. 1487, 1503 (2002).
83. Id. at 15o6-07.
84. Id. at 1507 (citing N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 1977 SEC LEXIS 2252, at 1 (Mar. 9, 1977)).
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the corporate financial reporting process. '8 s Within one year of the release of
the panel's report, all of its recommendations were proposed simultaneously as
rules by the NYSE, NASDAQ and the American Stock and Options Exchange;
the rules were later approved en masse on December 21, 1999 by the SEC
under its statutory authority pursuant to section i9 (b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.86 The same joint approach was followed under both
Chairman Arthur Levitt and Chairman Harvey Pitt as they began to coordinate
the stock exchanges' rulemaking on executive compensation and stock options.
The SEC in 2000 (and again in 2001) called for a collaborative resolution of the
issue of the role of audit committees.87
The culmination of this process came in February 2002, when Chairman
Pitt sent a letter addressed to the chief executive officers of both the NYSE and
NASDAQ "asking" them to review their corporate governance listing
standards. 8 Pitt requested that the securities trading venues implement
mandatory codes of conduct, provide continuing education and ethical training
for officers and directors, and investigate whether audit committee
requirements should be strengthened by, for example, giving audit committees
the exclusive authority to hire and fire the outside auditor.8 9 He went so far as
to say that although the SEC's letter to the exchange leaders was worded as "a
request, it was expected to be implemented. They should move with
alacrity." 90 Thus, in a regulatory area to which it was once foreign, the SEC is
now making rules that must be followed.
85. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC, NYSE and NASD Announce Blue Ribbon Panel
To Improve Corporate Audit Committees (Sept. 28, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/pressarchive/1998/98-96.txt.
86. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange, 64 Fed. Reg.
71,518 (Dec. 21, 1999); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc., 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (Dec. 21, 1999); Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 21, 1999).
87. See Vicky Stamas, Options-Disclosure Rule OKd: SEC Requires Firms To Tell Shareholders More
About Stock Offered to Workers in Compensation Plans, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2001, at C4;
Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, Remarks Before the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Securities
Industry Association (Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch42o.htm.
88. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate Governance, Conduct
Codes (Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt (discussing
the letter).
8g. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Recent Post-Enron Corporate Governance
Developments (June 25, 2002), http://www.cybersecuritieslaw.com/GDC/PostEnron.htm
(describing Pitt's letter).
go. Stamas, supra note 87.
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C. Sarbanes-Oxley: Usurping the Authority of State Judges and Legislatures
As noted above, every legislative intrusion into a policy space is
accompanied by a corresponding increase in executive power. So it is with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 9 ' the most important piece of federal law in the
corporate and securities fields since the New Deal.92 Congress, of course, was
trying to take advantage of the policy window created by the wave of corporate
scandals that immediately preceded the statute's enactment. 93
While in reality an unimportant event in the economic life of the nation,
Enron's downfall created a unique policy window that facilitated the
implementation of corporate governance initiatives despite the fact that those
initiatives "had minimal or absolutely no relation to the source of that firm's
demise."94 Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in a panicked frenzy as Congress and
the President attempted to quell the public outrage over Enron and perhaps
even to gain some measure of political advantage from the scandals. 9
Considering the broad scope of Sarbanes-Oxley and its unprecedented
intrusion into corporate governance - a traditional domain of state law - the
law's provisions are cursory and its structure skeletal. This cursory treatment
reflects the hasty legislative consideration given to the Act. From the outset,
Sarbanes-Oxley was criticized by corporate governance experts. As one
commentator observed, lawyers described the Act as a "sparsely worded law
[that] is both poorly written and hastily put together so there's little to go on
when it comes to interpreting some of its murkier provisions."" Another
commentator asserted that the Act is "a telling example of the law of
unintended consequences. It will have wide-ranging effects on securities,
derivative and other [private] shareholder lawsuits. '9 7 In general, analysts
criticized the legislation on four grounds:
91. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
9a. At the signing ceremony, President Bush described the statute as the "most far-reaching [set
of] reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002,
at A.
93. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523-26 (2005).
94. Id. at 1526.
95. See David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress Rode a "Storm" to Corporate Reform, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2002, at Al (depicting the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as the result of a
political process that "harnessed" the "perfect storm" created by the "convergence of
concerns over the plummeting stock market and a string of revelations about corporate
malfeasance").
96. Renee Deger, New Law Has Corporate Lawyers Scrambling, RECORDER, Aug. 8, 2002, at 1.
97. Gregory P. Joseph, Master Class: Corporate Fraud Act, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2002, at B9.
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(I) that it was unnecessary, (2) that the changes it made were at best
only incremental, (3) that on balance it was undesirable because it
would impose significant new costs on US firms, or (4) that it was
probably unnecessary because modern markets were liquid and quite
capable of responding adequately to fraud on their own without
additional regulation9 8
The statute vastly increased the power of a federal agency, the SEC, at the
expense of state courts, particularly the Delaware judiciary. Notably, provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley govern the duties of corporate directors to monitor the
ongoing operations of their corporations.99 Under state law prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley, directors' duties included the duty "to attempt in good faith to assure
that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes
is adequate, exists."' ° Failure to fulfill this duty may have rendered a director
"liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.''
'
The state-law approach to the issue of ongoing monitoring of the corporation
is reflected in the seminal case In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation, in which the Delaware Court of Chancery held, in accordance with
the business judgment rule, that "only a sustained or systemic failure of the
board to exercise oversight -such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists-will establish the lack of
good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."" 2
Sarbanes-Oxley, on the other hand, significantly restricts the authority of
corporate boards to determine, on the basis of their own business judgment,
the sort of internal corporate monitoring systems that their corporations
should have in place. In particular, section 404 of the Act requires companies to
publish in their annual reports an acknowledgement of management's
responsibility to establish internal controls and procedures for financial
disclosure, an assessment by management of the effectiveness of these controls
and procedures, and an independent auditor's report.1"3 Section 302 of
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the SEC to adopt and enforce rules requiring the
98. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS,
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 595 (9 th ed. 2005).
99. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. II 2002)). The principal cases articulating the nature and scope of
directors' duties to provide ongoing monitoring of corporate activities are In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), and Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
1OO. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 971.
103. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789.
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chief executive officers and the chief financial officers of public corporations to
certify that the periodic reports filed by their companies with the agency do not
contain material misrepresentations or omissions and "fairly present" their
firms' financial conditions and the results of operations. 4
In her benchmark article on Sarbanes-Oxley, Professor Roberta Romano
argues that the certification provisions are a "less explicit infringement on state
corporate law" than other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley." '° Even provisions-
like the certification requirements - that may not directly intrude into the
domain of state corporate law nevertheless crowd the states' traditional
authority to regulate the internal corporate governance of firms. In particular,
Sarbanes-Oxley intrudes into the state laws that govern the directors' authority
to determine what sort of internal controls are appropriate for their firms on a
case-by-case basis. The point here is not simply that these provisions conflict
with the laws promulgated by the states, although they most certainly do.
Other substantive corporate governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley relate to
executive loans," 6 the provision of non-audit services,'0 7 and independent
audit committees0 8 These provisions displace or depart from traditional state
law approaches. What is significant is that in passing Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress greatly enhanced the power not only of the SEC, but also of the
President, who retains influence over the day-to-day implementation of the
statute through his influence over the SEC.
Though Congress received much of the initial credit for acting decisively to
address the alleged crisis of investor confidence, the real winners from these
initiatives were the federal executive branch and its agencies. For example,
whatever short-run benefits inured to Congress pale in comparison with the
massive increases in the SEC's budget that followed the corporate scandals:
The SEC received a $100 million budget increase in 2003 and was the only
federal agency to receive substantial budget increases in both 2003 and 2004'09
104. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777.
1os. Romano, supra note 93, at 1540.
106. An exception is made for loans by corporations that are financial institutions offering credit
in the ordinary course of their business, provided that the terms of the credit are the same as
those offered to the public. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 783.
107. Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771.
1o8. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775.
lo9. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 117, 119 (2004).
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III. MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE
The most effective weapon in the arsenal of the executive branch is its
ability to litigate. Litigation accomplishes the political objectives of the
executive far faster than regulation. Litigating does not require the tedious
deliberative process and the built-in delays required by the notice-and-
comment periods necessarily associated with rule-making. For this reason,
administrative agencies have succumbed to the temptation of litigating instead
of regulating."' In terms of projecting authority and obtaining influence, it is
worth noting that, while the litigation process is slow, litigation can be
initiated instantaneously. Generally, the initiation of litigation against a high-
profile defendant garners headlines. The mere filing of a complaint and the
attendant publicity accomplish for the executive its political objective of
appearing decisive, responsive, and effective. Even if the action is ultimately
unsuccessful, the issue is unlikely to remain politically salient by the time it is
finally resolved on the merits. This, in turn, reduces the perceived cost to the
executive of initiating frivolous lawsuits.
In theory, a trial before an independent court affords the regulated entity
protection from abuses of administrative discretion. In practice, however, the
remote possibility of judicial review of agency decisions does not come close to
mitigating the reality that the initial indictment or complaint can end the
business of the firms and the careers of the individuals. In fact, the possibility
of meaningful judicial review can best be described as a pleasant fiction that
lends a patina of legitimacy to the modern administrative agency practice of
regulating by litigating. If courts are to be taken seriously as a hedge against
potentially overly aggressive regulation, they will have to be more active in the
face of the increasing power of the executive branch.
One need not embrace the view that regulation is systematically over-
intrusive to reach this result. Rather, one need only take the view that
regulatory initiatives sometimes reflect bureaucratic turf-grabbing and other
inappropriate uses of regulation. The role of courts is not to strike down all
attempts to regulate, but rather to monitor the executive in order to check what
may be occasional bureaucratic excess. Some have suggested that this
monitoring function could be accomplished by a revision of the Chevron
doctrine. For example, rather than deferring to any rational application of an
ambiguous statute, courts could conduct a searching review into legislative
110. For overviews of the SEC's turn toward more aggressive enforcement, see U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 9-26 (2006); and Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities
Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON RG. 149, 157-58
(1990).
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intent to see whether the agency interpretation comports with the best reading
of that intent."' Courts could also rein in the discretion of agencies by striking
down ambiguous regulations. By forcing agencies to write clear rules, courts
would limit the arbitrary exercise of executive power."1 2 Another alternative
would be for courts to recognize the legislative veto as a legitimate way of
restoring the constitutional equilibrium that has been disrupted by the rise of
the administrative state."'
The emergence of executive power explains several puzzling features of
modern political life. First, it provides one reason for the hostility of the
judicial confirmation process. In recent years, confirmation hearings have been
characterized by the perplexing spectacle of senators imploring nominees to be
more active and interventionist in their scrutiny of legislation."4 This is a
highly confusing situation because one would suppose that Congress, which
enacts the statutes that the federal courts are construing, would prefer that the
courts adopt a deferential attitude toward Congress in their review of such
statutes. However, in line with the idea that the executive has assumed an
increasing amount of control over legislative enactments, Congress prefers an
activist judiciary as a means of curbing executive power.
The congressional preference for an activist judiciary has been in evidence
since at least the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork. More recently, during
the confirmation hearings of Justice Samuel Alito, this preference became even
more sharply focused. In speeches on the Senate floor, for example, Democratic
senators complained that during his career as a federal appellate judge Alito
had appeared to defer to executive authority to such a degree that they feared
he would acquiesce to presidential claims of expanded powers.' Thus,
Congress's commitment to judicial power is a measure of the extent to which
iii. See Greene, supra note 17, at 185-86 (discussing such review as one alternative).
112. See Manning, supra note 58, at 655-60.
113. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 8o CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1994).
114. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr., To Be ChiefJustice of
the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 117-18 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Biden) (discussing judicial activism in the context of sex discrimination).
115. See Maura Reynolds, Alito Debate Focuses on Executive Power, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at
Alo. Similarly, Senator Edward Kennedy emphasized his view that an activist judiciary is
needed to curb executive power, observing that "[e] specially when we have a president who
wants to stretch his powers to and beyond constitutional limits, we need judges who can be
independent of the president and act to preserve the balance of powers that provides a
strong and fair foundation for our free society." Tony Mauro, A Field Guide to the Alito
Confirmation Hearings, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://www.law.
con/jsp/article.jspid=113654191544o. Of course, Congress is unlikely to be as supportive of
judicial activism where such activism manifests itself in the form of applying the Commerce
Clause narrowly.
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Congress views the judiciary as a potential ally in its losing war against the
increasing power of the executive.
Second, the judiciary's acquiescence in the increase in executive power has
enabled the executive to create administrative agencies solely on the basis of an
executive order. , 6 Presidents acting unilaterally created the National Security
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms."' Not surprisingly, agencies created by the
executive branch tend to be organized to maximize the President's control over
those agencies."'
This analysis sheds new light on Professor William Riker's seminal
observation that Congress's willingness to create administrative agencies and
the consequent rise of the administrative state can be explained by the fact that
the creation of such agencies enables Congress to deflect blame from itself for
bad or politically unpopular outcomes." 9 When Congress acts directly, it must
accept the blame for its actions. When administrative agencies are created,
Congress can not only take the credit for acting decisively to address the issues
for which the agency is responsible, but can also deflect the blame if, later on,
the agency makes decisions and promulgates policies that prove to be
unpopular.
Presidents, however, tend to be blamed for administrative agency decisions
because such agencies are viewed as vehicles for diffusing presidential power to
a particularized level. It is widely known that Presidents are increasingly held
responsible for a wide variety of issues, from the state of the economy, 2' to
116. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 75-76 (2003);
William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095, 1O96
(2002).
117. HOWELL, supra note 13, at 128.
118. Sixty-seven percent of agencies created by the President and eighty-four percent of agencies
created by executive subordinates are placed either within the Cabinet or directly within the
Executive Office of the President. Id. at 127. Only fifty-seven percent of agencies created by
Congress are organized in such ways. Id. In addition, Presidents control agencies by
removing restrictions that limit their own discretion to make political appointments; by
having agencies report directly to themselves, rather than to independent boards or
commissions; and by giving themselves unfettered power to fire appointees to the agencies
they unilaterally create. Id. at 129-30.
1i9. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 233-53 (1982); see also WILLIAM
H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY
OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
120. Ray C. Fair, Econometrics and Presidential Elections, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 89;
Ray C. Fair, The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President, 6o REV. ECON. & STAT. 159
(1978).
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casualty rates in war,"2' to the fallout from natural disasters like Hurricane
Katrina. It seems clear that, just as the executive has demonstrated a relentless
ability to act unilaterally, so too has the public demonstrated a concomitant
tendency to hold the President primarily responsible for all sorts of problems
that may not, in fact, really be within the President's control. This fact
probably provides an added incentive (if any was needed) for Presidents to
attempt to amass power. It stands to reason that if the President is being held
responsible for outcomes, he should at least have the power to influence those
outcomes.
Third, the rise of executive power influences how we come to measure
modern political accountability. If the analysis here is correct, then it is no
longer accurate to evaluate the success of Presidents using the traditional
method of political science-the extent to which they succeed in persuading
Congress to enact into law their policy agendas. 22 There are plenty of rules and
regulations and administrative agencies that Presidents use to accomplish their
objectives without the need to consult Congress. Direct action, executive
orders, and agency jawboning are tools that allow Presidents to take the
initiative to accomplish their goals on their own, without the need for new
legislation. Because Presidents are much less reliant on Congress than they
once were, they seldom need to succeed in the legislature to achieve their own
policy goals. Therefore, as a purely descriptive matter, it is no longer
appropriate to measure the performance of the executive branch by how often
it succeeds in getting its policies enacted into law.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of the executive branch as the first among equals in the
formation and implementation of U.S. policy is largely attributable to inherent
structural differences among the three branches of government. However, the
executive's structural advantage, particularly the fact that it can act
preemptively by initiating litigation, was a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for its predominance.
121. RICHARD C. EICHENBERG & RICHARD J. STOLL, THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF WAR: IRAQ.AND
THE DOMESTIC STANDING OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 8 (2004), available at
http://ase.tufts.edu/polscVfaculty/eichenberg/political-fortunes.pdf.
122. HOWELL, supra note 13, at 177. Howell argues that theories about presidential power to act
unilaterally "turn[] on its head the conventional account of presidential power. Strong
presidents, it is generally supposed, distinguish themselves with a long record of legislative
successes. The hallmark of weak presidents, meanwhile, is an inability to convince Congress
to enact legislative proposals." Id.
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The other critical element in the executive's success was the acquiescence of
the other branches to its usurpation of power. The judiciary could have
implemented rules to check executive power but instead has done the opposite
and has refused to intervene in agency action under almost any circumstance.'23
Similarly, Congress could use its various powers, particularly its control over
the budget, to exert its will over the executive, but it has chosen instead to
refrain from challenging the executive. Congress has also contributed to the
executive's usurpation of power by passing statutes such as Sarbanes-Oxley
that further consolidate power in the executive.
A divided government characterized by checks and balances and separated
powers is the cornerstone of the American constitutional system. At least
according to the Framers, tyranny can best be avoided by preventing one
branch of government from becoming too powerful. The emergence of the
modern administrative state, and particularly the emergence of the presidency
as the most powerful branch of government, is troubling from the perspective
of constitutional theory. Equally alarming is the fact that the other branches
not only acquiesce but also actively participate in the gradual amassing of
power by the executive branch. Thus, the lack of any conflict among the
branches as a result of the executive's usurpation of power should give us
pause.
The question now raised by this analysis is whether some strategy can be
designed to energize the judiciary so that it is less acquiescent to executive
branch imperialism. The problem is not that the judicial branch lacks the tools
to redress the tilt of power toward the executive. Courts could reassert their
authority in a number of ways, such as by rejecting the Chevron doctrine and
reasserting the authority of the judiciary over administrative agencies in the
realm of statutory interpretation. Even short of adopting a Calabresian
approach to updating statutes, courts could aggressively interpret statutes such
as the Administrative Procedure Act to make agencies more accountable. And,
of course, the time-honored doctrines of procedural and substantive due
process could be deployed to strike down executive actions that are viewed as
too aggressive.
The problem of constitutional disequilibrium has resulted in part from a
judicial culture in which courts routinely subordinate their authority to that of
the executive. The objective of reforming this culture would not be merely to
empower Congress. By undertaking more active review of agency
interpretations of statutes and regulations, the judiciary can rein in executive
lawmaking authority and restore the traditional system of checks and balances
among the three branches of government.
123. See supra notes 55-S9 and accompanying text.
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